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ABSTRACT
In the United Kingdom, the Met Office issues regionally calibrated impact-based weather warnings. These
aim to reduce harm to people and property. To decrease risk from severe weather, it is important to
understand how members of the U.K. public interpret and act on these warnings. This paper addresses
this through a postevent survey (n 5 552) conducted following Storm Doris, a 2017 winter storm during
which wind warnings were issued across much of the United Kingdom. Survey questions examined 1)
understanding of impact-based wind warnings, 2) interpretation of local warning level, 3) predictors of
perceived local risk (likelihood, impact severity, concern) implied by warnings, 4) predictors of trust in
the forecast, and 5) predictors of recalled and anticipated action. Our findings indicate that U.K. resi-
dents generally understand that weather warnings are based on potential weather impacts, although
many do not realize warnings are regionally calibrated. We also find that while local warning levels are
rarely underestimated, they may sometimes be overestimated. Institutional trust in the Met Office and
perceived vulnerability to weather predict both perceived risk and behavioral response, while warning
‘‘understandability’’ is linked to greater trust in the forecast. Strikingly, while differences in local
warning levels influenced risk perception, they did not affect recalled or intended behavioral response.
This study highlights the importance of institutional trust in the effective communication of severe
weather warnings, and a need for education on impact-based weather warnings. Above all, it demon-
strates the need for further exploration of the effect of weather warnings on protective behavior.
1. Introduction
In the United Kingdom, severe weather poses a
threat to property, infrastructure, well-being, and even
lives. Through timely impact-based warnings, the Met
Office’s National Severe Weather Warning Service
aims to inform the public, government, and decision-
makers about potential impacts from severe weather
and prompt appropriate protective action. Under-
standing how the public responds to such warnings is
important for effective service delivery. While the Met
Office conducts regular postevent surveys with the
public to monitor and improve the National Severe
Weather Warning Service, there have to date been
comparatively few peer-reviewed studies exploring
responses to severe weather warnings in the United
Kingdom. Addressing this gap is important for eval-
uating communications, and identifying where fu-
ture improvements can be made. Findings from other
countries where more studies exist can provide valu-
able insights into the factors that may affect behav-
ioral response to severe weather warnings. However,
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these may not always transfer directly to the United
Kingdom because of differences in regional climate
and cultural context. In this paper we first review the
literature on three key areas of evidence pertaining
to weather risk communication: the interpretation
of impact-based weather warnings, risk perception,
and individual differences. We then start to address
the lack of U.K. research by examining responses to
Storm Doris, a severe winter storm that moved across
the United Kingdom overnight and into the morning
of 23 February 2017, bringing gusts of wind up to
94 mph and receiving widespread coverage in main-
stream and social media. We explore how the warn-
ings were interpreted and the factors predicting
recalled and anticipated responses to impact-based
wind warnings.
a. Interpretation of weather warnings
1) IMPACT-BASED WARNINGS
Since 2011 the Met Office has issued impact-based
warnings based on the likelihood and potential se-
verity of negative consequences resulting from se-
vere weather (Goldstraw 2012). Thismarked a departure
from earlier phenomena-based warnings, which were
based solely on specific meteorological thresholds
being crossed (e.g., wind speed mph, mm of precipita-
tion). The rationale for this approach is that identical
meteorological conditions may represent a more severe
threat to people and property in one region than another
because of differences in infrastructure, population, and
hazard preparedness. For instance, in the case of the
2013 Saint Jude’s storm, areas with the highest expected
risk of vehicles overturning in strong winds were not
those expected to have the highest wind speed
(WMO 2015). In the United Kingdom, public con-
sultations show support for impact-based warnings
(Goldstraw 2012). The approach is also supported
by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO
2015). Indeed, studies conducted in the United States
suggest that the phrase ‘‘warning’’ is widely interpreted
as reflecting the anticipated impacts of severe weather
rather than meteorological conditions alone (Williams
et al. 2017). Impact-based (vs phenomena-based) mes-
sages have also been linked to greater warning
comprehension (Potter et al. 2018) and intention to
undertake protective behaviors (Casteel 2016, 2018;
Morss et al. 2018; Weyrich et al. 2018), although these
may not always be those recommended (Ripberger
et al. 2015a).
TheMet Office currently issues impact-based warnings
for winds, rainfall, snow, ice, thunderstorms, lightning,
and fog. At the time of StormDoris, a traffic light system,
used alongside predefined action statements, denoted
four levels of warning: green (since replaced by gray)5
no warning, yellow 5 be aware, amber 5 be prepared,
and red5 take action. While the action statements have
since been discontinued and replaced by more specific
guidance about how to respond to the warning, color-
coded warning levels remain. Warning levels integrate
information about expected likelihood and local impact
severity, using the warning impact matrix format shown
in Fig. 1. This means that an amber warning could rep-
resent either higher likelihood of less severe impacts or
lower likelihood of more severe impacts. Warnings are
also location dependent, reflecting regional differ-
ences in vulnerability to weather impacts. That is to
say that the meteorological conditions needed to
trigger an amber wind warning in an area where strong
winds are rare may be lower than areas where they are
common and infrastructure is less vulnerable to wind
damage.
The switch from phenomena-based warnings to
impact-based warnings is still relatively recent. Some
individuals may thus be unaware that warning thresh-
olds differ between locations. If so, this could lead
those in locations more frequently exposed to specific
weather phenomena (e.g., strong winds, heavy rainfall)
to discount warnings on the basis that their region is
better able to cope with severe weather than others.
Indeed, evidence indicates that people draw on past
experience to reinterpret weather warnings. For in-
stance, it has been consistently found that people pre-
sented with deterministic forecasts draw inferences
about the uncertainty surrounding these (Morss et al.
2008; Peachey et al. 2013). This type of reinterpretation
is appropriate in some contexts (e.g., inferring that
uncertainty surrounds a deterministic forecast, using
local knowledge to judge the threat from a phenomena-
based forecast). However, where these are already
accounted for it may lead to recipients making in-
appropriate adjustments.
2) COMMUNICATING LEVELS OF RISK
Where any warning system with multiple warning
levels is implemented, there is an implicit assumption
that these different levels will be understood. In the
United States, however, it has been found that ‘‘watch,’’
‘‘advisory,’’ and ‘‘warning’’—each denoting a different
status—are often conflated or misinterpreted (Donner
et al. 2012; Morss et al. 2016; Ripberger et al. 2015b;
Silver 2015; Williams et al. 2017). This is concern-
ing as appropriate understanding of these terms has
been linked to appropriate action (Morss et al. 2016).
Color may also be used to convey levels of risk. U.S. re-
search exploring the use of color saturation in tornado
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warnings has linked dark red with greater perceived
threat and intention to act (Ash et al. 2014), while
‘‘four color’’ (green, yellow, amber, red) scales are
linked to faster processing of warning information
(Miran et al. 2017). However, misunderstanding may
arise when color-coded warning schemes are not in-
tuitively understood. In Hong Kong, where red has dif-
ferent cultural connotations, people have been found
to be unsure of whether amber or red storm warnings
represent the greater level of severity (Wong and Yan
2002). In the United Kingdom, the ‘‘green, yellow, am-
ber, red’’ scheme that forms the basis of the Met Office
warnings is ubiquitous (e.g., traffic lights, food labeling).
The only published study to date on decision-making
using the Met Office matrix suggests that the ordinal
nature of the scale is well understood (Mu et al. 2018).
However, this study was conducted with a highly edu-
cated student sample. Recent qualitative work on U.K.
heat-wave health communication, which also uses traffic
light coding but not an impact matrix, demonstrates that
amber heat health alerts may not always be understood
to denote greater risk than yellow alerts (Tang and
Rundblad 2015).
The Met Office website provides a weather warnings
guide with the objective of clarifying what each warn-
ing level means (Met Office 2018). However, this is not
available in all channels that disseminate warnings, al-
though recent articles in the national (BBC 2017a) and
local (Trim and Ashe 2018) media have discussed what
different levels mean. This raises the question of how
FIG. 1. (a) National severe weather warnings for the United Kingdom from the Met Office website Thursday
23 Feb; and (b) weather warning matrix format at the time the Storm Doris warnings were issued.
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perceptions of yellow and amber warnings issued by the
Met Office differ among the wider public and whether
this affects response to them.
3) WARNING MAPS
A warning map is presented to users of the Met
Office’s public-facing web page (Fig. 1). For warning
maps aimed at the public, evidence regarding com-
prehension is mixed. Casteel and Downing (2013)
found no added benefit of adding a map to text-only
tornado warnings. However, a recent study of wild-
fire warnings found maps to be superior to text-only
messages (Cao et al. 2016). This may reflect differ-
ences in both the nature of the events and the pro-
tective actions that should be undertaken in response
to them (i.e., shelter vs evacuate)
On the Met Office website, the warning map is ac-
companied by a table summarizing warnings for each
governmental region of the United Kingdom. Re-
gional warnings represent the highest warning level
that exists within the region. The warning for one’s
region may thus be higher than for one’s specific local
area (i.e., on the map). People using the Met Office
app or searching the website for their specific loca-
tion will see the warning level for their local area by
default. During Storm Doris there were regional-
scale amber wind warnings for each governmen-
tal region in England and Wales, with the exception
of North East England. However, the map shows
that large areas of South West England, South East
England, East of England, North West England,
Wales, and Yorkshire and Humber were within the
yellow warning area. There were thus differences
between regional-scale and local warnings across
some of the areas affected by warnings. This raises
two questions. First, are judgments of individual risk
guided by regional warnings or the map? Second,
when a location is close to the border of two warning
levels on the map how is local risk level interpreted?
Research on tornado warning maps suggests that
people perceive areas near the warning periphery as
lower risk than central areas, despite this not being the
case (Jon et al. 2018, 2019; Lindell et al. 2016). For
U.K. weather warnings, it is thus useful to determine
whether those close to the border of different warning
levels (e.g., yellow and amber) perceive personal risk
differently than those clearly within one warning level
and whether this affects behavioral response.
b. Perceived risk
In the broader risk-communication literature, links
between perceived risk and behavioral response
have been found in some studies but not others (see
Wachinger et al. 2013, for review). It is thus important to
examine the extent to which perceptions of risk evoked
by weather warnings correspond with behavioral re-
sponses. Scientific conceptualizations of risk are often
characterized as a function of impact severity and
probability (e.g., Spiegelhalter and and Riesch 2011).
However, risk perception research suggests that likeli-
hoods are often neglected when threats evoke strong
negative feelings (e.g., Sunstein 2003). In Mu et al.’s
(2018) decision experiment participants were found to
link U.K. weather warning levels more strongly with
impact severity than impact likelihood, unless pre-
sented with an impact matrix. At longer time scales,
public willingness to prioritize future climate change
impacts for adaptation is predicted by concern about
the consequences of these impacts, rather than their
anticipated likelihood of occurring (Taylor et al. 2017).
Similarly, hazards that elicit strong negative emotions
are perceived as more threatening and likely to occur
than those that elicit less negative emotions (Finucane
et al. 2000). However, until now, there has been little
examination of the extent to which expectations of
event likelihood, severity and concern elicited by U.K.
weather warnings are associated with warning level and
individual differences, or whether they are linked to
behavioral response.
c. Individual differences
1) TRUST
Trust has been identified as a predictor of both risk
perception and behavior (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000;
Wachinger et al. 2013). In the United Kingdom, trust
in authorities is associated with greater adherence to
summer heat protection messages (Lefevre et al. 2015),
while qualitative work examining the Environment
Agency’s flood warnings suggests that diminished trust
in flood risk information providers may be a barrier to
protective behavior (Parker et al. 2011). Outside of the
United Kingdom, several studies have linked trust in
forecast providers to appropriate protective behaviors
across different weather risks (e.g., Kox et al. 2015;
LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Morss et al. 2016; Sherman-
Morris 2005). Recent evidence also suggests that, in
addition to trust in forecasts leading to greater perceived
threat from severe weather, warnings for more severe
conditions may elicit greater trust (Losee and Joslyn
2018). When examining the role of trust in weather
warning response it is thus important to identify the
factors associated with perceived trustworthiness of
forecast information, as well as the extent to which
trust in forecast information and forecast information
providers predicts behavioral response.
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2) EXPERIENCE
Direct experience of natural hazards has been linked
to greater perceived risk (Wachinger et al. 2013), and
willingness to take protective action (Lindell and
Perry 2012). In the context of severe weather, however,
findings have beenmixed (Weinstein 1989). Some studies
have linked severe weather experience and greater
protective response (e.g., Comstock andMallonee 2005;
Schumann et al. 2018; Silver and Andrey 2014), while
others have found no relationship or a negative associ-
ation (e.g., Kox and Thieken 2017; Nagele and Trainor
2012; Paul et al. 2015; Potter et al. 2018). Possible rea-
sons for this inconsistency include hazards being expe-
rienced without serious harm (Dillon et al. 2011), the
salience of past events diminishing over time (Wachinger
et al. 2013), media coverage leading to those who were
not directly affected by the event to gain indirect expe-
rience (Silver and Andrey 2014), and differences in the
way that experience is measured (e.g., recalled experi-
ence vs recorded events; Huang et al. 2016). In the
United Kingdom, flood experience has been linked to
greater flood risk preparedness (Harries 2012). How-
ever, it may also lead to fatalistic avoidance, inhibiting
protective behaviors (Harries 2008). In the context of
Storm Doris, we thus assess whether individual differ-
ences in previous (recalled) negative experience of
strong winds will be associated with a stronger
likelihood of changing behavior in response to wind
warnings.
3) WEATHER ATTITUDE AND ENGAGEMENT
Perceived vulnerability to environmental hazards
has been linked to engagement with protective be-
haviors (Lindell and Perry 2012; Wachinger et al.
2013), though this may depend on perceived self-
efficacy (Harries 2008; Wachinger et al. 2013). How-
ever, there has to date been no published research
examining the extent to which perceived vulnerability
to severe weather affects responses to the severe
weather warnings issued by the Met Office. Likewise,
the relationship between individuals’ engagement
with the subject of weather and response to weather
warnings has not been examined in the United King-
dom. Internationally, a small number of U.S. studies
have, however, linked greater weather engagement
with more appropriate weather warning understanding
and response (Stewart 2009; Stewart et al. 2012). In a
U.K. context it is thus important to examine whether
individual attitudes toward the subject of weather,
including perceived vulnerability and engagement,
are predictive of behavioral response to weather
warnings.
4) DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
The relationship between demographic character-
istics and weather warning response has been widely
studied. However, findings have been inconsistent. Some
studies have linked home ownership to protective action
(Kox and Thieken 2017; Sherman-Morris 2013), while
others have not (Morss et al. 2016). Likewise, women have
reported greater protective intentions in some studies
(Kim et al. 2014; Potter et al. 2018; Silver and Andrey
2014), but not others (Silver and Andrey 2014). As
Sherman-Morris (2013) notes, this is likely due to these
relationships being context dependent, with the nature of
specific hazards determining the link between demo-
graphic characteristics and responses. We thus control for
their role in specific weather risk contexts.
2. Research questions
This study explores both the U.K. public’s interpre-
tation of wind warnings issued during Storm Doris
and the factors associated with perceived risk elicited
by the warning, trust in the warning, recalled response
to the warning, and anticipated future response to
similar warnings. Of particular interest was the extent
to which the warning level for a local area at the time
of Storm Doris predicted individual responses when
individual differences were controlled for. Conse-
quently, we addressed the following five research
questions (RQ):
RQ1Towhat extent do individuals understand that wind
warnings issued by the Met office are impact-based?
RQ2 To what extent are individuals’ interpretations
of local wind warning levels consistent with the
Storm Doris warning map shown on the Met Office
website?
RQ3 To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict anticipated local risk
(likelihood, severity, concerningness) in response to
wind warnings?
RQ4 To what extent do wind warning characteris-
tics and individual differences predict trust in the
forecast?
RQ5 To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict recalled and antici-
pated response to wind warnings?
3. Methodology
a. Participants
A total of 600 participants from England and Wales
were recruited from panels maintained by the research
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company ResearchNow to take part in an online sur-
vey. Participants completing the survey were awarded
points by ResearchNow, which could be exchanged for
gift cards. A total of 48 participants were excluded
from the analysis because their postcode region did not
clearly fall within an area covered by wind warnings on
the Met Office’s warning maps for 21–23 February
2017 (the Storm Doris period). The remaining 552
(55% female, n 5 306) ranged in age from 18 to 85
[mean5 44, standard deviation (sd)5 16], with a median
estimated household income of £30,000–£39,999. Of these,
42% had completed at least a bachelor’s degree and
62% were home owners. Ethical approval for this
study was granted by the Leeds University Business,
Environment and Social Sciences joint Faculty Re-
search Ethics Committee (AREA FREC).
b. Weather context and local warnings
Storm Doris was first named on 21 February 2017
when warnings for wind, snow, and rain were first
issued by the Met Office for 23 February. On the
night between the 22 and 23 February the storm un-
derwent explosive cyclogenesis, and was labeled a
‘‘weather bomb’’ (Met Office 2017a). It led to strong
winds across England and Wales with gusts of up to
94 mph, causing power cuts and major disruption to
transport (BBC 2017b; Met Office 2017a). It was
reported in the national media to have led to at least
one fatality and an estimated £400 million in eco-
nomic losses (BBC 2017b; White 2017). Storm Doris
was the fourth named storm to occur during the
2016/17 winter storm season. While preceding storms
Angus, Barbara, and Connor did bring localized
strong winds to some areas of the United Kingdom,
Doris led to widespread disruption across the coun-
try (Met Office 2017b). The survey took place be-
tween 10 and 14 April 2017, within seven weeks of
the Storm Doris warnings. Figure 1 displays Met
Office warnings for Thursday 23 February when wind
warnings covered the widest geographic area. Yellow or
amber wind warnings were in place over most of England
andWales, while snowwarnings were issued for Scotland
and North East England. Warnings for rain were also
issued for Northern Ireland and North West England.
Between Storm Doris and the survey, no other named
storms or severe weather warnings were issued. In the
present analysis, the map (rather than regional-scale
warnings) is used as a guide to participants’ local wind
warning level, although all participants come from areas
where regional-scale amber warnings were in place. This
was done first, to enable a comparison between warning
levels, and also because the map reflects the warnings
delivered by the Met Office app.
Based upon their postcode sector, participants were
classified as being in an amber or yellow area if their post-
code location fell clearly into one or the other on the map.
Participants were classified as ‘‘border’’ when their postcode
location fell into both amber andyellowwarning areas.Each
category was coded as a dummy variable. Amber warning
was the reference category in all analyses. Information on
warnings for specific postcode areas was not, at the time of
data collection, retained by the Met Office. Hence, coding
was done by superimposing postcode maps on Met Office
warning maps for 23 February 2017 and manually identify-
ing which category each postcode area fell into.
c. Measures
1) UNDERSTANDING OF IMPACT-BASED
FORECASTS
The extent towhich participants interpreted forecasts as
being impact based (vs phenomena based) was examined
by level of agreement (15 strongly disagree, 55 strongly
agree) with six statements (Table 1), presented in ran-
domized order. Three statements were consistent with
an appropriate impact-based interpretation of warnings
(e.g., ‘‘Warnings for strong winds are based on what the
impacts of strong wind could be for a particular area’’).
Three were consistent with an inappropriate phenomena-
based interpretation of warnings (e.g., ‘‘The conditions
needed to trigger a severe weather warning are the same
across the whole UK’’).
2) INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL WARNING LEVEL
Participants were shown the Storm Doris warnings
for 23 February onscreen (Fig. 1) and asked to indicate
which wind warnings they perceived to be in place for
their local area. Participants could select ‘‘yellow,’’
amber,’’ or ‘‘not sure.’’ A small number of participants
(2%, n5 11) selectedmore than one option. Responses
were coded as amber if both ‘‘amber’’ and ‘‘yellow’’
were selected, reflecting the higher warning level.
3) ANTICIPATED RISK
Participants were instructed to imagine that they saw
the weather warnings from 23 February 2017 (picture
onscreen) again, and use sliders to rate how likely (0 5
impossible: 100 5 certain), severe (0 5 not severe at all:
1005 very severe) and concerning (05 not concerning at
all: 1005 very concerning) they would expect the impacts
of strong wind to be in their local area.
4) TRUST IN THE FORECAST
Trust in the StormDoris forecast was rated on a slider
scale of 0 (5would not trust at all) to 100 (5would trust
completely).
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5) RECALLED RESPONSE
Participants were shown a prompt comprising a screen-
shot of national weather warnings issued on 23 February
2017 from the Met Office’s website (see Fig. 1), and asked
whether they remembered seeing or receiving a warning
for wind during this time.
The 315 who answered ‘‘yes’’ were asked to indicate
whether it ‘‘had any effect on your decision-making or
behavior after seeing it?’’ by choosing all behavioral
responses, from a list of 20, that they recalled (see
online supplemental material for a full breakdown).
These items, which were adapted from responses to
previous Met Office surveys, included making decisions
TABLE 1. Summary of items comprising multiple-item questions.
Scale items Response options
Interpretation of impact-based forecasts
The conditions needed to trigger a severeweather warning are the same across thewhole
United Kingdoma
The conditions needed to trigger a severe weather warning are different for different
parts of the United Kingdomb
1 5 strongly disagree
A red warning for strong winds will be more serious for areas of the United Kingdom
that are less used to strong windsa
2 5 disagree
It takes more severe strong winds to trigger a red warning for strong winds in areas that
experience a lot of strong windsb
3 5 neither agree nor disagree
Warnings for strong winds are based only on the maximum wind speed that is expected
to occura
4 5 agree
Warnings for strong winds are based on what the impacts of strong winds could be for a
particular areab
5 5 strongly agree
Understandability
This weather warning is easy to understand 1 5 strongly disagree
There are some parts of this weather warning that I find confusingc 2 5 disagree
I like the design of this weather warning 3 5 neither agree nor disagree
I think that the design of this weather warning could be improvedc 4 5 agree
5 5 strongly agree
Trust in the Met Office
The U.K. weather warning shown in this questionnaire is provided by the Met Office. How do you feel about the Met Office?
(Choose the point on each of the scales below that you think best represents your views.)
Has different values: Shares my values
Different goals to me: Same goals to me
Opposes my views: Supports my views
Does not act like me: Acts like me Bipolar 1–5 scales
Incompetent: Competent
Inaccurate: Accurate 1 5 highest agreement with negative
statements (low trust)Unreliable: Reliable
5 5 highest agreement with positive
statements (high trust)
Harmful: Beneficial
Low ability: High ability
Irresponsible: Responsible
Unfriendly: Friendly
Weather Attitude
Interest subscale
I pay a lot of attention to weather forecasts
I am interested in weather forecasts
Vulnerability subscale 1 5 very untrue for me
The weather has a big impact on my day-to-day life 2 5 mostly untrue for me
Bad weather makes it difficult for me to get around 3 5 sometimes true for me
I worry about the weather a lot 4 5 mostly true for me
Disengagement subscale 5 5 very true for me
Weather forecasts are not relevant to me
I hardly ever think about the weather
The weather does not affect my daily activities very much
a Phenomena-based statement (incorrect).
b Impact-based statement (correct).
cReverse coded.
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to avoid the potential negative impacts of bad weather
(e.g., ‘‘I shopped early’’) and deliberate protective ac-
tions (e.g., ‘‘I secured things around my property’’).
Response were coded as a binary variable 15 protective
behavioral response, 0 5 no protective response taken.
It should be noted that not all protective responses
reported represent optimal protective behavior (e.g.,
‘‘walking everywhere’’ to avoid transport disruption
may increase individual risk from strong wind).
6) ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
Anticipated response to seeing the warning again
was measured by the question ‘‘do you think that
seeing this forecast would affect your decision-
making or behavior?’’ (coded as 0 5 no/do not
know, 1 5 yes).
7) UNDERSTANDABILITY
Perceived understandability of the weather warn-
ing displayed was measured using mean level of
agreement (15 strongly disagree, 55 strongly agree)
with four items (e.g., ‘‘This weather warning is easy to
understand’’). Principal components analysis indi-
cated that these items loaded onto a single scale
(Cronbach’s alpha 5 0.76; negatively phrased items
were reverse coded). Scale items are detailed in
Table 1.
8) TRUST IN THE MET OFFICE
Trust in the Met Office was measured using 11
items adapted from Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) (see
Table 1). Participants were presented with bipo-
lar dimensions (e.g., ‘‘not trustworthy–trustworthy,’’
‘‘unreliable–reliable’’) and selected the point, on a
five-point scale, that best reflected their opinion of
the Met Office. Principal components analysis in-
dicated that all items loaded onto a single scale
(Cronbach’s alpha 5 0.94).
9) NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE OF STRONG WIND
Participants were asked whether they had ever
personally experienced any negative consequences
as a result of strong wind (recoded as no/do not
know 5 0, yes 5 1).
10) ATTITUDE TO WEATHER
Attitude toward weather was measured using
agreement with eight statements (Table 1) on a scale
of 15 very untrue for me, 55 very true for me). These
items were not directly adapted from existing scales,
but were based on considerations of the wider risk-
communication literature (e.g., Wachinger et al. 2013),
and qualitative responses given by participants in
earlier Met Office postevent surveys. Principal com-
ponents analysis indicates that the items loaded onto
three subscales: interest in weather (e.g., ‘‘I am in-
terested in weather forecasts’’), perceived vulnerabil-
ity (e.g. ‘‘Bad weather makes it difficult for me to get
around’’), and disengagement (e.g. ‘‘I hardly ever
think about the weather’’). Cronbach’s alpha . 0.70
for all subscales.
11) DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
We recorded participants’ age, sex (0 5 male, 1 5
female), education (recoded as 05 no higher education,
15 higher education), household income band (15 less
than £10,000, 2 5 £10,000–£19,999, . . . , 15 5 £150,000
or more), and home ownership (0 5 not a home owner,
1 5 home owner)
4. Results
a. To what extent do U.K. residents understand that
the severe wind warnings issued by the Met Office
are impact based?
Figure 2 shows agreement with statements about the
impact-based (vs phenomena-based) nature of U.K.
weather warnings. For all statements, a substantial
proportion of participants selected ‘‘neither agree
nor disagree,’’ indicating that many felt that they did
not know the answer. Most participants (58%) ap-
propriately agreed that ‘‘Warnings for strong wind are
based on what the impacts of strong wind could be for a
particular area,’’ indicating broad awareness that
warnings are based on potential impacts. However,
the fact that the conditions needed to trigger weather
warnings are different for different regions was not
well understood, with only 37% agreeing that ‘‘it takes
more severe strong wind to trigger a red warning for
strong wind in areas that experience a lot of strong
wind.’’
b. Are U.K. residents’ interpretations of their local
risk level during Storm Doris consistent with the
map shown on the Met Office website?
In total 491 participants responded to the ques-
tion asking them to indicate which warnings were in
place for their area according to the 23 February
2017 forecast. According to the warning map, 201
of the participants who responded to this question
were in amber warning areas, 100 were on the bor-
der between yellow and amber areas, and 190 were
in yellow warning areas. Regional-level amber
warnings were, however, in place for all regions
sampled.
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For amber warning areas on the map, 80% (n5 160)
of participants correctly interpreted their local warn-
ing level as amber, while 7% (n 5 14) incorrectly in-
terpreted it to be yellow and 13% (n 5 27) were ‘‘not
sure.’’ In border areas, 60% (n 5 60) participants in-
terpreted their local warning level as amber, 26%
(n 5 26) yellow, 14% (n 5 14) were ‘‘not sure.’’ In
yellow areas 52% (n 5 98) interpreted their local
warning as yellow and 32% (n 5 62) as amber, while
16% (n5 30) were ‘‘not sure.’’ We therefore find that
very few participants in amber warning areas un-
derestimated their local warning level. Likewise,
those in border areas tended to interpret their
warning level as amber. For those in yellow warn-
ing areas on the map, a substantial minority identi-
fied their local warning level as amber. The selection
of the amber warning by these participants was not
wholly incorrect as amber-level regional warnings
were in place. However, it was inconsistent with
the map.
c. To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict anticipated local risk
and trust in forecast?
Table 2 displays mean scores on each continuous
dependent and independent variable by warning
level. Ratings of anticipated likelihood, impact
severity, concern, and trust in the forecast were
highest for participants in amber warning regions
and lowest for those in yellow warning regions,
with border regions falling between the two. As the
four dependent variables were highly correlated
with one another (r $ 0.50, p # 0.001 for all), a
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA)
was used to assess the factors predicting them.
Warning level was entered as a fixed factor, while
individual difference measures were entered as
covariates. Table 3 reports unstandardized re-
gression coefficients for each predictor on each
dependent variable. Full details of the MANCOVA
and associated p values can be found in the sup-
plemental material. Here, we focus on those pre-
dictors that reach statistical significance at p # 0.05
in the MANCOVA.
Among those in yellow warning areas anticipated
likelihood, severity, concern and trust in the forecast
were lower than those in amber warning areas. Antic-
ipated likelihood was lower for those in border areas
than amber areas. Trust in the Met Office was associ-
ated with greater anticipated likelihood, concern and
trust in the forecast. Greater perceived vulnerability
predicted greater anticipated likelihood, impact se-
verity, and concern. Home ownership was associated
with greater anticipated severity of impacts. Perceived
understandability was associated with greater trust in
the forecast. While 175 (32%) of all participants
reported negative experience of strong winds, this did
not independently contribute the prediction of our
FIG. 2. Percentage of participants agreeing with statements about the impact-
based (vs phenomena based) nature of severe weather warnings in the United
Kingdom. Frequencies are given within the bars for each response type for each
question.
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measures of anticipated risk or trust in forecast when
other independent variables were controlled for.
d. To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict recalled and
anticipated response to wind warnings?
1) RECALLED RESPONSE
Binary logistic regression was used to examine the
predictors of recalled response to the Storm Doris
warnings (1 5 protective response). Model 1 con-
tained local warning level (amber as the reference
class), negative experience of strong winds, perceived
understandability, trust in the Met Office, weather
attitude (interest, vulnerability, disengagement sub-
scales), and demographic characteristics (age, sex,
education, income, and home ownership). Model 2
added anticipated risk (likelihood severity and con-
cern) and trust in the forecast. Full statistical output
from this analysis can be found in the supplemental
material.
In model 1 protective response was associated with
greater negative experience of strong winds, interest
in weather and perceived vulnerability (Table 4). In
model 2, protective response was associated with
greater negative experience, interest in weather and
anticipated concern. In model 2, perceived vulnera-
bility ceased to make an independent contribution to
the model. This suggests that the association between
perceived vulnerability and anticipated response is
accounted for by the relationship between perceived
vulnerability and anticipated concern.
2) ANTICIPATED RESPONSE TO FUTURE
WARNINGS
Binary logistic regression assessed the predictors
of anticipated response to seeing the warning again
(Table 5). Two models were tested. Model 1 contained
TABLE 2. Mean (standard deviation) scores for all continuous dependent and independent variables by warning area.
Yellow Border Amber Overall
Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd)
Dependent variables
Anticipated likelihood 56.92 (20.35) 61.64 (18.84) 67.50 (17.43) 62.24 (19.42)
Anticipated severity 50.78 (20.54) 57.38 (19.21) 60.87 (18.15) 54.25 (19.80)
Anticipated concern 45.71 (23.95) 51.51 (22.69) 56.60 (21.51) 51.40 (23.17)
Trust in the forecast 62.03 (21.90) 64.94 (18.79) 68.25 (19.84) 65.18 (20.58)
Independent variables
Trust in the Met Office 3.79 (0.73) 3.72 (0.70) 3.78 (0.75) 3.77 (0.73)
Weather attitude: Vulnerability 2.84 (0.85) 2.69 (0.83) 2.77 (0.85) 2.78 (0.85)
Weather attitude: Interest 3.49 (0.97) 3.46 (0.93) 3.48 (0.92) 3.48 (0.94)
Weather attitude: Disengagement 2.44 (0.85) 2.50 (0.77) 2.68 (0.89) 2.55 (0.85)
Perceived understandability 3.23 (0.83) 3.19 (0.84) 3.34 (0.67) 3.27 (0.78)
TABLE 3. Linear regression models, predicting anticipated likelihood, anticipated severity, concern, and trust into the forecast (n5 509).
Note * is significant at p # 0.05, ** at p # 0.0, and *** at p # 0.001; B (SE) denotes unstandardized regression coefficient.
Anticipated likelihood Anticipated severity Anticipated concern Forecast trustworthiness
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Warning: Yellow 210.67 (1.89)*** 29.25 (1.90)*** 210.10 (2.12)*** 25.31 (1.85)**
Warning: Border 25.93 (2.24)** 25.50 (2.24) 22.50 (2.51) 22.08 (2.19)
Age 0.02 (0.06) 20.01 (0.06) 0.14 (0.07) 20.02 (0.06)
Sex (1 5 female) 0.09 (1.71) 0.57 (1.72) 1.87 (1.92) 0.97 (1.67)
Education (1 5 higher education) 20.38 (1.75) 22.05 (1.75) 21.83 (1.96) 0.57 (1.71)
Income 0.17 (0.31) 20.06 (0.31) 20.21 (0.35) 0.35 (0.30)
Homeowner (1 5 homeowner) 2.47 (1.94) 5.52 (1.94)** 1.24 (2.18) 1.52 (1.90)
Negative experience (1 5 yes) 0.88 (1.81) 0.63 (1.81) 3.18 (2.03) 1.89 (1.77)
Understandability 0.16 (1.14) 0.77 (1.14) 0.62 (1.28) 3.44 (1.11)**
Trust in Met Office 4.65 (1.36)*** 2.67 (1.36) 3.88 (1.52)** 10.59 (1.33)***
Weather attitude: Interest 1.70 (1.20) 0.96 (1.20) 20.71 (1.34) 1.40 (1.17)
Weather attitude: Vulnerability 2.27 (1.17)* 4.22 (1.17)*** 10.41 (1.31)*** 1.24 (1.14)
Weather attitude: Disengagement 20.27 (1.04) 1.06 (1.04) 0.36 (1.17) 0.33 (1.02)
R2 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.24
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warning level, demographic characteristics (age, sex,
education, income, home ownership), trust in the Met
Office, perceived understandability, negative experi-
ence of strong wind, and weather attitude (interest,
vulnerability, disengagement subscales). Model 2,
added anticipated risk (likelihood, severity, concern)
and trust in the forecast. Full statistical output
from this analysis can be found in the supplemental
material.
No association was found between warning level
and anticipated response. In model 1, perceived
vulnerability, trust in the Met Office, and negative
experience were positively associated with antici-
pated response. In model 2, concern emerged as the
strongest predictor of anticipated response, with an-
ticipated severity making a smaller contribution to the
model. Trust in the Met Office and negative experi-
ence continued to contribute significantly. The in-
dependent contribution of perceived vulnerability
ceased to be significant, again suggesting that the as-
sociation between perceived vulnerability and antic-
ipated response is accounted for by the relationship
between perceived vulnerability and anticipated
concern.
5. Discussion
This study explored howmembers of the U.K. public
interpret and respond to the Met Office’s impact-
based weather warnings. Through a postevent survey
conducted following the Storm Doris wind warnings,
we examined understanding of the impact-based na-
ture of U.K. weather warnings (RQ1) and the consis-
tency of local warning level interpretations with actual
local weather warning levels (RQ2), along with the
predictors of anticipated local risk (RQ3), predictors
of forecast trustworthiness (RQ4), and predictors of
recalled and anticipated response (RQ5).
a. To what extent do U.K. residents understand that
the severe wind warnings issued by the Met Office
are impact based?
Over half of our participants correctly related warning
levels to the potential impacts of severe weather. This
is in keeping with U.S. research suggesting that people
tend to interpret warnings as being based on the
consequences of severe weather by default (Williams
et al. 2017). However, there was lower recognition of
the fact that the meteorological conditions under
which warnings are issued differ between regions,
along with a generally high level of uncertainty about
each of the statements. Failure to realize that warning
thresholds differ between locations could lead people
in areas that experience more frequent and intense
meteorological phenomena (e.g., wind, precipitation,
snow) to underestimate local risk implied by warnings on
the grounds that they are used to these events occurring
and thus more resilient than those in other areas. This
highlights a need for clearer communication with the
U.K. public about the fact that warning thresholds are
TABLE 4. Hierarchical binary logistic regression examining predictors of protective response to the Storm Doris warnings (n 5 297).
Note * is significant at p # 0.05, ** at p # 0.0, and ***at p # 0.001; B (SE) denotes unstandardized regression coefficient, and Exp(b)
denotes standardized regression coefficient.
Model 1 Model 2
B (SE) Exp(b) B (SE) Exp(b)
Warning: Yellow 20.25 (0.30) 0.78 0.04 (0.33) 1.04
Warning: Border 0.27 (0.38) 1.31 0.40 (0.39) 1.49
Age ,0.01 (0.01) 1.00 20.01 (0.01) 0.99
Sex (1 5 female) 20.15 (0.27) 0.86 20.22 (0.28) 0.80
Education (1 5 higher education) 0.03 (0.28) 1.03 20.01 (0.29) 0.99
Income 20.04 (0.05) 0.96 20.06 (0.05) 0.94
Home owner (1 5 homeowner) 20.54 (0.33) 0.58 20.54 (0.34) 0.58
Understandability 20.23 (0.19) 0.80 20.30 (0.20) 0.74
Negative experience (1 5 yes) 0.69 (0.29) 2.00* 0.63 (0.30) 1.87*
Trust in Met Office 0.31 (0.23) 1.36 0.08 (0.25) 1.08
Weather attitude: Interest 0.41 (0.20) 1.50* 0.44 (0.21) 1.56*
Weather attitude: Vulnerability 0.52 (0.19) 1.68** 0.38 (0.21) 1.46
Weather attitude: Disengagement 0.01 (0.19) 1.01 0.02 (0.19) 1.02
Anticipated likelihood 0.01 (0.01) 1.01
Anticipated severity 20.02 (0.01) 0.98
Concern 0.02 (0.01) 1.02*
Trust in forecast 0.01 (0.01) 1.01
x2 46.41*** 59.53***
Nagelkerke R2 0.20 0.25
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related to local impacts, and are different for different
regions.
b. Are U.K. residents’ interpretations of their local
risk level during Storm Doris consistent with the
map shown on the Met Office website?
When shown the Storm Doris warning map from the
Met Office website (23 February 2017), very few par-
ticipants underestimated the warning level for their local
area. A large majority of those in amber warning areas
correctly identified their warning level as amber. Indeed,
those on the border between amber and yellow warning
areas tended to select amber, as did a substantial mi-
nority of those in the yellow warning areas. The latter
finding could be attributable to the fact that regional-
level amber warnings were in place for all particip-
ants surveyed. This may indicate that when warning
levels are unclear (i.e., because they are on the border
between warning levels) or ostensibly inconsistent (i.e.,
with warnings for one’s general region being higher than
one’s specific location), people interpret their own
warning as being the higher of the two. It may also in-
dicate that some people struggle to correctly pinpoint
their local area on a map.
Taken together, this suggests that the U.K. public
tend not to underestimate warning levels for their local
area, although overestimation may occur. When local
warnings levels are unclear (i.e., where a location is
close to the border between amber and yellow warning
areas) people tend to perceive themselves as being in
the higher warning level. As the boundaries of warning
area do not have perfect deterministic accuracy, this
could reflect an appropriate precautionary response.
However, where people located far from warning area
boundaries overestimate their local warning levels this
may lead to ‘‘cry wolf’’ effects, when local conditions
are repeatedly less severe than anticipated. While
testing this directly is beyond the scope of the current
study, it does highlight the value of making it easy for
people to identify where their local area lies with re-
spect to geographic warning areas. This has been im-
plemented on recent versions of the Met Office’s
warning map, which allows website visitors to zoom in
on specific locations.
c. To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict anticipated local risk
(likelihood, severity, concerningness) in response
to wind warnings?
Strong correlations were found between anticipated
likelihood, severity and concern. This is consistent with
research indicating that threats evoking stronger neg-
ative emotions (e.g., concern) are perceived as being
more likely to occur and have more severe negative
consequences (Finucane et al. 2000). This is also con-
sistent with fact that, all threemeasures were positively
predicted by perceived vulnerability to severe weather.
A strong correlation between all anticipated risk
measures and warning trustworthiness was also in ev-
idence, while trust in the Met Office as an institution
TABLE 5. Hierarchical binary logistic regression examining predictors of anticipated response to future warnings (n 5 509). Note * is
significant at p # 0.05, ** at p # 0.0, and *** at p # 0.001; B (SE) denotes unstandardized regression coefficient, and Exp(b) denotes
standardized regression coefficient.
Model 1 Model 2
B (SE) Exp(b) B (SE) Exp(b)
Warning: Yellow 20.14 (0.23) 0.87 0.39 (0.26) 1.47
Warning: Border 0.17 (0.27) 1.18 0.40 (0.30) 1.49
Age ,0.01 (0.01) 1.00 20.01 (0.01) 0.99
Sex (1 5 female) 20.06 (0.21) 0.95 20.13 (0.23) 0.88
Education (1 5 higher education) 0.23 (0.22) 1.25 0.36 (0.24) 1.44
Income 20.07 (0.04) 0.93 20.08 (0.04) 0.92
Home owner (1 5 homeowner) 0.35 (0.24) 1.41 0.2 (0.26) 1.22
Negative experience (1 5 yes) 0.69 (0.22) 2.00** 0.68 (0.24) 1.97**
Understandability 0.07 (0.14) 1.08 0.02 (0.16) 1.02
Trust in Met Office 0.67 (0.17) 1.95*** 0.60 (0.2)0 1.81**
Weather attitude: Interest 0.26 (0.15) 1.30 0.32 (0.16) 1.37
Weather attitude: Vulnerability 0.54 (0.15) 1.71*** 0.23 (0.17) 1.26
Weather attitude: Disengagement 20.06 (0.14) 0.94 20.16 (0.15) 0.86
Anticipated likelihood ,0.01 (0.01) 1.00
Anticipated severity 0.02 (0.01) 1.02*
Concern 0.03 (0.01) 1.03***
Trust in forecast ,0.01 (0.01) 1.00
x2 104.25 175.66
Nagelkerke R2 0.25 0.39
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was a significant predictor of anticipated likelihood
and concern. This may indicate that people who per-
ceive weather warnings (and their providers) to be
trustworthy are more likely to believe that they convey
a personal threat. As noted, however, recent experi-
mental evidence suggests that this association may be
bidirectional, with more severe warnings also eliciting
greater trust (Losee and Joslyn 2018).
As might be expected, those in yellow warning
areas anticipated strong winds to be less likely, se-
vere, and concerning than those in amber areas. For
participants in border areas, ratings of likelihood,
severity, and concern fell between those for yellow
and amber regions. Overall, this suggests a generally
appropriate interpretation of the Met Office warning
levels, but with some ambiguity in risk perception
among those on the border between different warning
levels. This is consistent with our finding that some
participants in border areas perceived their local
warning level to be yellow, while others perceive it to
be amber. It may also reflect a broader tendency for
those on the periphery of warning areas to perceive
their own level of risk to be lower than those in the
center (Jon et al. 2018; Lindell et al. 2016). Once
again, this highlights the importance of members of
the public being able to identify the warning level in
place for their location.
Home ownership was associated with anticipated
impact severity, perhaps reflecting homeowners’ greater
direct responsibility for repairing property damage.
However, this did not correspond with greater concern.
No other demographic characteristic made an inde-
pendent contribution to the prediction of the anticipated
risk variables.
Together these findings indicate that for U.K. wind
warnings, such as those issued for Storm Doris, antic-
ipated personal risk is driven not just by the local
warning level but by individual differences in per-
ceived vulnerability to weather and trust in warning
providers. It should, however, be kept in mind that this
study was intentionally conducted following a severe
weather event. Hence, participants’ perceptions of
vulnerability—and thus anticipated risk—may have
been influenced by the salience (or ‘‘availability’’) of
their Storm Doris experiences (e.g., exacerbated by
negative experience or attenuated by lack of negative
experience).
d. To what extent do wind warning characteristics and
individual differences predict trust in the forecast?
Trust in the forecast had a strong positive association
with trust in the Met Office as an institution. It was also
negatively associated with being in a yellow (vs amber)
warning area and positively associated with perceived
warning understandability. The fact that participants in
amber warning locations trusted the forecast more than
those in yellow warning locations corroborates Losee
and Joslyn’s (2018) findings that warnings for more
severe events can elicit greater trust than those for less
severe events. As trust in the forecast could not have
conceivably affected the geographic areas covered by
yellow and amber warnings, it is reasonable to infer
that the severity of the warning level influenced trust.
The positive association between perceived under-
standability and trust in the forecast may suggest that
messages that are perceived to be difficult to un-
derstand are less likely to be trusted. While perceived
understanding of weather and climate information does
not always correspond with objective understanding
(Lorenz et al. 2015; Wong and Yan 2002), perceived
‘‘ease of understanding’’ is closely tied to communication
preferences (Taylor et al. 2015). Our findings therefore
demonstrate the importance of ensuring that forecasts
are perceived as easy to understand as well as being
correctly understood.
e. To what extent do warning characteristics and
individual differences predict recalled and
anticipated response to wind warnings?
With respect to decisions about behavioral responses
to the Storm Doris warnings, findings were similar for
both recalled response and anticipated future response.
In both cases, concern evoked by the warning was
the largest predictor of protective response. Consistent
with findings from the broader literature on natural
hazards, perceived vulnerability was associated with
both recalled and anticipated response (Lindell and
Perry 2012; Wachinger et al. 2013). However, it ceased
to provide a unique contribution to the prediction once
concern was entered. This suggests that those who
perceive themselves to be vulnerable to weather risks
tend to be more concerned when faced with severe
weather warnings, and that this is linked to greater
willingness to engage in protective responses. In terms
of weather attitudes, we also find that those with a
greater general interest in weather were more likely
to report having undertaken a protective response.
This corresponds with findings from the United States
linking individual ‘‘weather salience’’ to protective
behavior (Stewart 2009; Stewart et al. 2012). However,
caution should be advised in interpreting this finding.
The fact that it was significantly associated with re-
called but not anticipated response could also indicate
that those with greater interest in weather found it
easier to recall the Storm Doris weather warning and
their response to it.
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In keeping with previous studies in the United
Kingdom (Lefevre et al. 2015) and elsewhere (Kox et al.
2015; LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Morss et al. 2016;
Sherman-Morris 2005), we found that those reporting
greater institutional trust in the Met Office were more
likely to indicate that they would undertake protective
response to future warnings. It is worth noting that in
the final regression model with all other variables con-
trolled for, only trust in the Met Office as an instit-
ution (vs trust in the forecast information itself) was
significantly associated with anticipated response. This
suggests that the relationship between organizational
trust and behavioral response goes beyond confidence
in warning accuracy.
While previous negative experience of strong winds
was not linked to greater perceived risk, we did find
that it was positively associated with both recalled and
anticipated response. This is in line with the broader
risk research literature, which has linked negative risk
experience to greater risk preparedness (Wachinger
et al. 2013).
Strikingly, we did not find any link at all between
local warning level and either recalled or anticipated
response. As our sample size was large enough to de-
tect small effects, this is unlikely to be due to a lack
of statistical power. One possibility is that responses
were influenced by the regional-level warnings (amber
across the United Kingdom) rather than local-level
warnings illustrated on the map. However, this would
not account for the fact that local warning level was
associated with anticipated risk and forecast trustwor-
thiness. Another possibility is that the existence of a
warning as opposed to warning level affects whether a
behavioral response is undertaken. If this is the case,
then it could suggest that responses to wind warnings
may not be sensitive to differences in warning level, at
least with respect to yellow and amber. However, as the
nature of the Storm Doris event meant that a ‘‘no
warning’’ control group was impossible (i.e., because all
areas of the United Kingdom have some form of
regional-level warning in places), we cannot conclu-
sively confirm whether this is the case. If it is, however,
then it has important implications for weather warning
delivery in the United Kingdom, as it could suggest that
protective responses do not become more likely as
warning levels increase. Further research is therefore
needed to assess whether this is the case for other types
of severe weather event and how responses to yellow
and amber warnings compare to those for red warnings
and ‘‘no warning’’ controls.
In summary, our findings show that protective re-
sponse is consistently linked to negative experience
and concern (associated with perceived vulnerability),
and that trust in the Met Office has an important link
with behavioral intention. However, we do not find any
effect of local warning level on recalled or anticipated
response, potentially indicating that a switch from
yellow to amber does not necessarily increase the
likelihood of protective response.
f. Limitations
As with all postevent surveys our study has limita-
tions. First, in examining behavioral response to the
Storm Doris warning among a large sample we are
reliant on self-report measures of what people did
rather than direct observations. However, even if there
had been time to construct a behavioral observation
study in the interim between the Storm Doris warning
first being issued and its impacts being realized it would
not have been feasible to acquire observations from a
sample of this size. It does, however, suggest an im-
portant role for further econometric evaluations in
assessing the realized benefits (economic and health)
of weather warnings. Second, isolated postevent sur-
veys capture responses at one point in time, meaning
that they cannot detect changes in weather warning
response behavior. With meteorological services often
updating weather warning delivery, this highlights
the value of continually assessing public interpretation
and response. Third, while the items used to assess
comprehension of impact-based forecasts highlight
where misinterpretations may occur, further qualita-
tive work would be useful to gaining a more detailed
understanding of forecast interpretation. Last, in eliciting
measures of anticipated risk we presented participants
with information about the color-coded warning level
for their local area, but did not present accompanying
impact matrices. Given Mu et al.’s (2018) finding that
matrices increased focus on likelihood (vs severity) in a
student sample, future work should establish how they
affect perception and action among broader public
samples.
6. Conclusions and implications
This study has five important implications for U.K.
weather warning communication. First, the public
tends to correctly link impact-based warnings to the
consequences of severe weather but is less aware that
these are locally calibrated. This indicates a need for
education to avoid people underestimating the level
of local risk indicated by severe weather warnings be-
cause they believe their local area to be more resilient
to specific events than other regions of the United
Kingdom. Second, local warning levels do not tend to
be underestimated, but they may be overestimated
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when warning maps are presented alongside regional-
level warnings. In some cases this may reflect appro-
priate uncertainty about the boundaries of warning
areas. However, in others it suggests that people either
do not consult the map or are unable to identify their
map location. Our findings support the Met Office’s
decision to provide website users with options to identify
their specific location on the warning map. Third, as
in other risk contexts, institutional trust in warning
providers has a critical link with expectations about the
threat posed by severe weather events and behavi-
oral intentions. Moreover, perceived trustworthiness
of specific forecasts is perceived to be higher when
warnings are perceived as easy to understand. This
demonstrates the critical importance of building and
maintaining trust in weather warning providers and
ensuring that warning information is perceived as easy
to understand. Fourth, intention to undertake a pro-
tective response is most strongly linked with concern
about the event, which is related to perceived vulnera-
bility. Identifying effective communication strategies
to address cases where perceived vulnerability and
concern are inconsistent with assessed level of risk,
should thus be a focus of further research. Fifth, we
have found that behavioral response to severe wind
warnings may not be sensitive to gradations of warn-
ing level, or at least the distinction between yellow and
amber, although the nature of Storm Doris does not
provide us with either a ‘‘no warning’’ control or a ‘‘red
warning’’ comparison. This highlights the need for
further experimental and postevent studies to further
explore whether this apparent lack of sensitivity to
warning levels is present for other types of weather
event. Above all, this study demonstrates the impor-
tance of conducting country-specific research to ex-
amine how the public interpret and respond to severe
weather warnings.
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